A renewed consideration of consideration: MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 553 by CHNG, Kenny & GOH, Yihan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
12-2016
A renewed consideration of consideration: MWB
Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising
Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 553
Kenny CHNG
Singapore Management University, kennychng@smu.edu.sg
Yihan GOH
Singapore Management University, yihangoh@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1274128
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
CHNG, Kenny and GOH, Yihan. A renewed consideration of consideration: MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock
Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 553. (2016). Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal. 16, (2), 323-332. Research Collection
School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1825
A renewed consideration of consideration: MWB
Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd
[2016] EWCA CIV 553
Kenny Chng and Yihan Goh
School of Law, Singapore Management University, Singapore
ABSTRACT
This note argues that the English Court of Appeal decision of MWB Business
Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd is a significant modification of the
present understanding of consideration with respect to agreements to accept
part-payments of a debt and to perform pre-existing duties, and that the
preferred way forward for the development of the law should be judicial
intervention by the Supreme Court to reconcile the logical inconsistencies
between Foakes v Beer and Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.
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1. Introduction
The English Court of Appeal decision of MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd
v Rock Advertising Ltd1 (‘MWB Business’) is a significant case on the doctrine
of consideration. In this case, the Court of Appeal re-examined important
principles in the law with regards to the relationship between the contro-
versial rule in Pinnel’s Case2 and the principle of ‘practical benefit’ set out
in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd3 (‘Williams v Roffey’).
This note will argue that the Court of Appeal’s analysis in MWB Business is
a significant modification of the present understanding of consideration
with respect to agreements to accept part-payments of a debt and to
perform pre-existing duties, and that the preferred way forward for the
development of the law is decisive intervention by the Supreme Court
rather than the mangling of the existing rules. It should also be mentioned
that although the case touches on the area of promissory estoppel, this
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note will not discuss that aspect of the case and will instead concentrate on
the consideration point.
2. Facts and decision
For present purposes, the facts of this case can be stated simply. The claimant,
MWB, managed office space in central London, while the defendant, Rock
Advertising, provided marketing services. MWB owned premises that were
occupied for several years by Rock Advertising as a licensee. In August
2011, Rock Advertising entered into an agreement with MWB for larger pre-
mises at increased fees. Unfortunately, Rock Advertising’s business expansion
plans were not as successful as it hoped. Rock Advertising eventually encoun-
tered financial difficulties and accrued unpaid arrears of over £12,000.
Consequently, in March 2012, MWB locked Rock Advertising out of the pre-
mises and gave notice of its intention to terminate the licence agreement to
Rock Advertising. MWB then commenced proceedings to recover the arrears.
In response, Rock Advertising argued that the parties had orally varied the
licensing agreement, such that Rock Advertising would pay reduced licence
fees for the first few months and subsequently pay more to make up for
the outstanding arrears. In the alternative, Rock Advertising argued that
MWB was estopped from denying the oral variation of the licence agreement,
since Rock Advertising had paid the first instalment of £3,500 under the
revised payment schedule to MWB on the same day that the oral variation
was made. As expected, MWB argued that the oral variation was in essence
an agreement for the partial repayment of an existing debt and hence unsup-
ported by consideration. MWB also argued that, in any event, Clause 7.6 of the
licensing agreement—which provided that ‘all variations to this licence must
be agreed, set out in writing and signed on behalf of both parties before they
take effect’—precluded the oral variation of a key term of that agreement, of
which the payment schedule was certainly one.
In relation to the consideration issue, the trial judge held that MWB had
received a ‘commercial benefit’ in retaining Rock Advertising as a tenant.
This was because, had MWB removed Rock Advertising as a tenant, it
would almost certainly have forfeited its chances of ever recovering arrears.
It would also have led to MWB’s premises being empty for some time. The
trial judge held that this commercial benefit constituted valid consideration
that made the oral variation agreement enforceable. However, the trial
judge eventually held that the oral variation to revise the payment schedule
was not valid because Clause 7.6 of the licensing agreement precluded any
oral variation of the core terms of the agreement. Put another way, even
though the oral variation of the payment schedule was supported by con-
sideration, this was not permitted due to Clause 7.6. Finally, with respect to
the argument on promissory estoppel, the trial judge held that the
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payment of £3,500 did not constitute detrimental reliance on Rock Advertis-
ing’s part, since this was an amount that it was already bound to pay. As
such, the trial judge found in favour of MWB. Rock Advertising appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeal.
In the Court of Appeal, both Kitchin and Arden LJJ devoted much of their
judgments to the issue of consideration. Indeed, this was after both judges
had found that Clause 7.6 did not preclude an oral variation of the licensing
agreement, including the payment schedule, if the parties had waived it. In
coming to this decision, Kitchin LJ relied on the recent English Court of
Appeal decision of Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd,4
which Kitchin LJ regarded as authoritative and premised on the overarching
reason of party autonomy. Accordingly, having decided that Clause 7.6 did
not preclude the oral variation of the licensing agreement, the main issue
on appeal turned out to be whether the oral variation was supported by
consideration.
Both Kitchin and Arden LJJ acknowledged that the question of whether
there was valid consideration had to be decided in the light of the House
of Lords decision of Foakes v Beer5 and that of the Court of Appeal in In re
Selectmove Ltd.6 It is well accepted that the House in Foakes v Beer approved
the rule in Pinnel’s Case that ‘payment of a lesser sum… in satisfaction of a
greater, cannot be any satisfaction for the whole’. Thus, MWB argued that
the principal benefit conferred by the agreement, comprising of MWB
being able to receive part-payment of the arrears promptly, was the kind of
practical benefit rejected in previous cases as ever capable of constituting suf-
ficient consideration. This argument was, however, rejected by both Kitchin
and Arden LJJ. Kitchin LJ said that the rule in Pinnel’s Case was qualified: for
example, it is well established that ‘the performance by the debtor of some
other act he was not bound by the contract to perform may constitute
good consideration’.7 Kitchin LJ drew attention to the trial judge’s finding
that the oral variation agreement ‘would have a number of beneficial conse-
quences’ for MWB, principally that MWB would not suffer losses arising from
empty premises which would have been incurred if Rock Advertising had left.
As such, because MWB derived a practical benefit ‘which went far beyond the
advantage of receiving a prompt payment of a part of the arrears’, this was
really a case like Williams v Roffey. The agreement between MWB and Rock
Advertising was thus supported by consideration.
Arden LJ commenced her analysis by referring to the general principle that
consideration will be shown if ‘the promisee shows that his renewed promise
to perform an existing obligation results in the promisor receiving a benefit
4[2016] EWCA Civ 396.
5(1884) 9 App Cas 605.
6[1995] 1 WLR 474.
7MWB Business (n 1) [41].
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which he requested or at least indicated he wanted from the renegotiation’.8
Arden LJ then held that In re Selectmove Ltd only decided that ‘the benefit
which a creditor obtains from a promise to pay an existing debt by instal-
ments is not good consideration in law’.9 It was that kind of practical
benefit which Arden LJ regarded Peter Gibson LJ as having rejected as
good consideration in In re Selectmove Ltd. However, Arden LJ did not think
that Peter Gibson LJ rejected the ‘general principle’, which is that if there
were other benefits, those could constitute practical benefits of the kind
recognised to be sufficient consideration in Williams v Roffey. Arden LJ
regarded her view of In re Selectmove Ltd as consistent with Lord Coke’s
dictum in Pinnel’s Case that gifts in addition to the payment of a lesser sum
can amount to good consideration. This is because the modern law has sub-
stituted those physical gifts with ‘practical benefits’, which are sufficient to
constitute good consideration.
3. A change in the current understanding of consideration
In spite of what they say, the fact is that Kitchin and Arden LJJ have both
changed the current understanding of consideration, at least in relation to
the restriction Foakes v Beer placed on the Williams v Roffey understanding
of practical benefit as consideration. Firstly, their reasoning has shifted the rel-
evant inquiry to the nature of the practical benefit, rather than the type of
transaction that should attract the application of the principle in Williams v
Roffey. The ambit of the rule in Pinnel’s Case and Foakes v Beer, as Peter
Gibson LJ in In re Selectmove Ltd understood it, is that a promise by a
debtor to repay his creditor in part for the settlement for the full debt can
never amount to good consideration. This is regardless of whether, as Peter
Gibson LJ put it, ‘the creditor will no doubt always see a practical benefit to
himself’.10 The extent of the restriction imposed by Foakes v Beer is thus con-
cerned with the nature of the promise, rather than that of the so-called prac-
tical benefit. Peter Gibson LJ in In re Selectmove Ltd recognised this. His
Lordship stated that the principle in Williams v Roffey was not to be extended
to ‘any circumstances governed by the principle of Foakes v Beer’11. The
emphasis on ‘circumstances’ evidently excluded theWilliams v Roffey principle
from transactions like the one arising in Foakes v Beer, that is, partial payments
of debts. Furthermore, Peter Gibson LJ was also alive to the fact that the credi-
tor can derive practical benefit beyond that of receiving prompt repayment of
part of the debt, but felt constrained by authority not to extend theWilliams v
8ibid [78].
9ibid [84].
10In re Selectmove Ltd (n 6) 481.
11ibid 481 (emphasis added).
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Roffey principle to ‘an obligation to make payment’.12 In the end, his Lord-
ship’s primary concern was evidently about leaving the principle in Foakes v
Beer with sufficient room for practical application.
In contrast, the reasoning employed by Kitchin and Arden LJJ, which shifts
the focus of the inquiry to the nature of the practical benefit rather than that
of the transaction, would strip that very principle of any real application. Even
in circumstances previously covered by the rule in Foakes v Beer, it is surely
very possible to find a practical benefit which ‘went beyond the advantage
of receiving a prompt payment of part of the arrears’.13 For example, on the
facts of In re Selectmove Ltd, which concerned an arrangement for a
company to repay part of its arrears to the Revenue, it is surely possible to
say that the Revenue derived the practical benefit of not having to expend
resources on the collection of the arrears, in addition to receiving prompt
repayment of part of the debt. This cannot be the kind of practical benefit
that Peter Gibson LJ would have permitted to upset the central restriction
occasioned by Foakes v Beer, which would rob it of all practical effect by a
side-wind.
Secondly, Kitchin and Arden LJJ’s reasoning leaves a curious inconsistency
within the restriction imposed by Foakes v Beer. It is true that there is a logical
inconsistency with recognising practical benefits in situations governed byWil-
liams v Roffey and not doing so for situations covered by Foakes v Beer, but
there is nonetheless internal consistency within each half of the law. It is this
—albeit unsatisfactory—consistency that has supported the restriction
imposed by Foakes v Beer without throwing the entire law of consideration
into disarray. Yet, by purporting to recognise a practical benefit that went
beyond the prompt repayment of part of a debt, the effect of Kitchin and
Arden LJJ’s reasoning is to do precisely that. There is no principled reason
why the law should single out, within the rubric of the part payment of a
debt, the prompt repayment of part of an existing debt as the practical
benefit that is insufficient to constitute consideration. Arden LJ’s view was
that this distinction is supported by the substitution of the words ‘the gift of
a horse, hawk or robe’ in Lord Coke’s rider in Pinnel’s Case with the concept
of practical benefit as ‘a more modern equivalent’.14 However, this view is
almost certainly wrong. The essence of Pinnel’s Case, and how it was under-
stood in Foakes v Beer, is that all forms of practical benefits can never
amount to good consideration within that paradigm. Lord Coke’s rider referred
to an additional obligation over and beyond an existing promise; that part of
Pinnel’s Case remains to the present day and cannot be substituted by grafting
onto it the practical benefit principle recognised by Williams v Roffey.
12ibid.
13MWB Business (n 1) [48].
14ibid [85].
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4. Broader implications for consideration
Quite apart from introducing further inconsistencies into the law in this
regard, MWB Business has broader implications for the doctrine of consider-
ation as well. As highlighted above, this decision shifts the relevant inquiry
to the nature of the practical benefit, and calls for the courts to identify
that the practical benefit involved is not the prompt repayment of part of
an existing debt. However, such an inquiry has the potential to shade into,
and is indeed not conceptually far removed from, a general assessment of
the type of practical benefit that would amount to adequate consideration
in each case. This is because, if a court can prefer some practical benefits to
others (such as by rejecting the practical benefit of prompt repayment but
accepting others), then it must surely be possible, even necessary, for a
court to assess whether these other practical benefits are indeed adequate.
Such an assessment would not sit easily with the long-standing principle
that consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate. That principle
is a reflection of the free market philosophy in contract law—that the ade-
quacy of consideration in transactions between parties is best left to be
valued by the parties themselves, rather than by the courts—and is also an
important contributor to certainty in contract law’s regulation of commercial
relationships. However, should the courts be required to make a general
assessment of the adequacy of practical benefit, it would be up to them to
make a value judgment of each promise to determine if it constitutes fair
or adequate practical benefit to serve as valid consideration. This assessment
may differ depending on individual judges’ views on best commercial prac-
tices or notions of fairness and justice, leading to different conclusions in
similar cases. For example, in MWB Business itself, the Court of Appeal
would have had difficulty justifying any disagreement with the trial judge’s
reasoning, if a different trial judge had concluded instead that MWB did not
receive any practical benefit from the agreement, after conducting a detailed
study of prevailing market conditions and assessing that MWB would be
financially better off by suing for arrears under the original agreement and
mitigating its losses by entering the market to get another licensee to
occupy its premises. The point being made, therefore, is that Kitchin and
Arden LJJ’s reasoning in MWB Business may be utilised as an inroad to upset-
ting the cherished principle that consideration need only be sufficient, but not
adequate.
Even more broadly, Kitchin and Arden LJJ’s attempt to read down the
restriction imposed by Foakes v Beer is reflective of how the modern law of
contract has tended to view the doctrine of consideration as an inconvenient
relic of the past that very often threatens to upset commercial bargains
reached between honest business people. Modern courts therefore find con-
sideration very easily and, as demonstrated by MWB Business, may even be
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willing to reinterpret the existing law creatively to achieve what they perceive
to be substantive fairness. However, if it is indeed the concern that a strict
adherence to consideration will upset commercial bargains, then surely the
solution is not to mangle the existing law but to rationalise the doctrine of
consideration at a more fundamental level and resolve the existing tensions
within the law. In this regard, it will be instructive to consider how foreign jur-
isdictions have sought to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine of
consideration. It will be seen that there are principally three approaches that
have been taken.
The first approach is simply to preserve the position taken by English law
before the decision in MWB Business. For example, Singapore and Hong
Kong continue to adopt the previous common law position, ie maintaining
a clear distinction between the Foakes v Beer and Williams v Roffey situations.
The key advantage of this approach would be to uphold the internal consist-
ency within the law governing each type of situation, although admittedly at
the expense of logical consistency between them. Nonetheless, it is worth
noting that this approach may soon be rejected even in Singapore and
Hong Kong. The courts in both jurisdictions have evinced a preference for
flexibility in the doctrine of consideration in order to align the law with com-
mercial realities.15 In particular, the Singapore courts have demonstrated
some degree of dissatisfaction with the dissonance between Foakes v Beer
and Williams v Roffey.16 Indeed, the law in Singapore in this regard appears
to be on the cusp of a new development: the Singapore Court of Appeal in
Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter17 suggested that it would only be
logical to extend the principle in Williams v Roffey to a Foakes v Beer18 situ-
ation, although the Court of Appeal stopped short of deciding the point as
it was not argued before the court.
The second approach adopted by some jurisdictions is to expand the types
of transactions in which practical benefit may be regarded as valid consider-
ation. This can be seen in some Australian jurisdictions. For example, in Musu-
meci v Winadell Pty Ltd,19 the Supreme Court of New South Wales
incrementally extended the principle in Williams v Roffey to cover cases
where the promisor agrees to accept a reduction of obligations. The key dis-
tinction between this approach and the approach taken by the Court of
Appeal in MWB Business is that this approach retains the focus on the types
15In the Singapore context, see Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594 (Singapore
High Court (SGHC)) [139] (affirmed on appeal in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] SGCA
2 (Singapore Court of Appeal)). In the Hong Kong context, see Chong Cheng Lin Courtney v Cathay Pacific
Airways Ltd [2010] HKEC 1748 (Hong Kong Court of Appeal (HKCA)) [50]–[51].
16Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2006] SGHC 222 [29].
17[2009] SGCA 3.
18ibid [103].
19(1994) 34 NSWLR 723.
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of transactions which are amenable to the practical benefit principle in Wil-
liams v Roffey, rather than the types of practical benefit which are capable of
constituting good consideration. Notably, however, the decision in Musumeci
v Winadell Pty Ltd has been interpreted to apply only to executory contracts,
that is, where the promisee still has an outstanding contractual obligation to
perform. Thus, in the specific context of the Australian jurisdictions which
have adopted the reasoning in Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd, the rule in
Foakes v Beer continues to be applicable in cases where the relevant trans-
action is a repayment of a debt owed to the promisor.20 Considering the
merits of this approach at a more general level, it is suggested that it has
two principal advantages. The first advantage of this approach is that an incre-
mental expansion of the types of transactions to which the practical benefit
principle applies minimises the possibility that a determination of whether
there is valid consideration will eventually shade into a judicial value judg-
ment of the adequacy of practical benefit. Secondly, this approach, if
applied broadly to extend the practical benefit principle in Williams v Roffey
to Foakes v Beer situations, resolves the existing logical inconsistency
between the Williams v Roffey and Foakes v Beer situations, without the
need to resort to a strained interpretation of the old authorities.
The third approach is to remove the requirement of consideration for con-
tract modifications altogether. For example, in Canada, the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal in Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc v NAV Canada21
decided to avoid the rigid application of the rule in Foakes v Beer by
holding that contract modifications are enforceable even if unsupported by
consideration, as long as they are not procured under economic duress. A
few provinces and territories in Canada have achieved a similar effect
through statutory reform.22 The rule in Foakes v Beer has been subject to revi-
sion via codification in the United States as well. Section 2-209 of the US
Uniform Commercial Code23 provides that modifications to a contract are
valid even without consideration, as long as the modification meets the test
of good faith. A similar view is also reflected in section 89(a) of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts.24 Although these codification attempts are not
20See, eg, Amos v Citibank Ltd [1996] QCA 129 (Queensland Court of Appeal).
21(2008) NBCA 28.
22See John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, (2nd edn, Irwin Law 2012) 262–63. See also Judicature Act,
RSA (Revised Statutes of Alberta) 2000, c J-2, s 13(1) (Canada); Law and Equity Act, RSBC (Revised Statutes
of British Columbia) 1996, c 253, s 43 (Canada); Mercantile Law Amendment Act, CCSM (Continuing Con-
solidation of the Statutes of Manitoba), c M120, s 6(1) (Canada); Mercantile Law Amendment Act, RSO
(Revised Statutes of Ontario) 1990, c M10, s 16 (Canada); Queen’s Bench Act, RSS (Revised Statutes of
Saskatchewan) 1998, c Q-1.01, s 64 (Canada); Judicature Act, RSNWT (Revised Statutes of the Northwest
Territories) 1998, c J-1, s 40 (Canada); Judicature Act, RSY (Revised Statutes of the Yukon) 2002, c 128, s 25
(Canada).
23Uniform Commercial Code s 2-209 (2002).
24Restatement (Second) of Contracts s 89(a) (1981).
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without their own problems of implementation, their key advantage is that
they preserve what is commonly perceived as the underlying rationale
behind the rule in Pinnel’s Case, ie to render contract modifications procured
under duress unenforceable, while decisively resolving the uncertainties of
the common law position by doing away with the requirement of consider-
ation entirely in such situations. However, given the lack of practical difficul-
ties posed by consideration due to the ease by which courts find it
satisfied, it is unlikely that a reform of consideration will be seen as an issue
pressing enough to merit codification by Parliament in most jurisdictions in
the Commonwealth.
What then should be the preferred approach for the development of the
law in this regard? It is suggested that under English law, authority, rather
than principle, has led to the current unsatisfactory state of affairs. Indeed,
since the rule in Pinnel’s Case was upheld by the House of Lords in Foakes v
Beer, the lower English courts have been unable to overrule it. Thus, when
faced with the unsettling prospect of the rule’s application, these courts
have been forced to either apply the rule with some hesitation, or draw
curious distinctions and boundaries that lead to ever-increasing logical incon-
sistencies in the law. Indeed, such judicial attitudes are readily apparent in the
Court of Appeal decisions of In re Selectmove Ltd, Williams v Roffey and MWB
Business. As such, the most direct approach would be for the Supreme
Court to reconcile Foakes v Beer and Williams v Roffey decisively in an appro-
priate case to bring logical consistency to the law’s treatment of promises to
accept less and promises to pay more for pre-existing duties. This can be
effected by a pronouncement that the rule in Pinnel’s Case, upheld in
Foakes v Beer, is best explained via the doctrine of economic duress. At the
same time, the Supreme Court could extend the Williams v Roffey ‘practical
benefit’ principle to cover Foakes v Beer situations. This solution would effec-
tively strike the relevant balance that the law in this regard is concerned with,
which as perceptively pointed out by Arden LJ, is between ‘enabling debtors
to rely on their creditors’ promises’ and ‘protecting creditors from debtors
who seek unfairly to gain an advantage from their creditors’.25 The added doc-
trinal advantage of this solution is that the applicable rule, ie, the rule in
Pinnel’s Case, would be rightly situated within the realm of the doctrine of
duress, rather than remaining as a curious inconsistency within the doctrine
of consideration sitting uneasily with its other rules. Once the Supreme
Court has taken the lead on this issue, it is expected that other common
law jurisdictions would follow suit.
25MWB Business (n 1) [87].
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5. Conclusion
To the extent that the MWB Business decision reflects an approach more
grounded in commercial realities, it should be welcomed. However, one
wonders whether these benefits have been achieved at the cost of introdu-
cing uncertainty in the applicable rules, as well as the distortion of the doc-
trine of consideration beyond all recognition. The decision in MWB Business
represents an admirable if doctrinally unsatisfactory judicial attempt at
dealing with one of the most intractable and puzzling issues in the doctrine
of consideration, but the difficulties which continue to ensue from this
latest crack at the problem point towards the need for a decisive solution
in the form of a judicial pronouncement from the Supreme Court. Even
more broadly, serious questions must be asked about the continuing utility
of consideration. If its existence serves only to prompt inconsistencies like
those introduced in MWB Business, then perhaps its problems have far
exceeded its original purposes, and the way forward is its outright abolition.
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